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Rosende et al.: Post-war Japan as a Sea Power: Imperial Legacy, Wartime Experienc

The only bright light was the submarine
offensive, which, for a while at least,
looked as though it might threaten the
British trade security. Once the allies
recognized the threat, their subsequent
mastery over the sea gave them all the
options they needed to maintain an
unpredictable and intolerable pressure over their adversary, an advantage
that could only lead to one outcome.

prior to Patalano’s welcome contribution, only three English-language books
have been dedicated to the subject:
Jim Auer’s The Postwar Rearmament of
Japanese Maritime Forces, 1941–1971
(Praeger, 1973); James Wolley’s Japan’s
Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971–2000
(Lynne Rienner, 2000); and Euan
Graham’s Japan’s Sea Lane Security,
1940–2004 (Routledge, 2005).

In summary, this is not a book for the
casual-interest reader. It will, however,
suit those who have a background in
the basics of the period and in maritime warfare generally, and who wish
to know more. Dr. Friedman’s research
credentials are impeccable, and the
huge amount of factual detail he has
unearthed will be sure to delight many.
While not definitive in any individual
theme area, there is nothing comparable
in either depth or scope out there, and
for this reason, if no other, this book
is likely to become a standard work on
the naval aspects of the Great War.

Post-war Japan as a Sea Power is particularly important because it offers unique
insight into JMSDF history by exploring
its organizational and cultural identity.
Patalano investigates the extent to which
the modern JMSDF draws on the experience and culture of its predecessor, the
Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), through
access to previously unavailable archival
materials, specifically records from the
service’s education system, recruitment
data, and internal JMSDF guidance
documents such as the New Instructions issued by each incoming chief of
staff from 1961 to 2012. On top of this
bedrock of archival research, Patalano, a
professor at King’s College London who
averages several months a year in Japan,
took advantage of his well-developed
relationships with JMSDF officers of all
ranks to conduct both focused interviews and group surveys. Patalano’s
extensive research reveals how heavily
the IJN legacy influences the structure,
role, and strategic outlook of the JMSDF.

ANGUS ROSS

Patalano, Alessio. Post-war Japan as a Sea Power:
Imperial Legacy, Wartime Experience and the
Making of a Navy. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. 272pp. $112

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense
Force (JMSDF) is one of the world’s
most powerful naval forces. As Alessio
Patalano points out in his new history
of the JMSDF, Post-war Japan as a Sea
Power, its surface force is twice the size
of that of the Royal Navy’s, and Japan
has three times as many submarines as
France. However, the JMSDF has been
the focus of surprisingly little writing by international historians. In fact,
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When Japan sought to establish a
maritime security force in the aftermath
of World War II, its leaders studied the
IJN—both its dramatic rise and catastrophic defeat. Patalano explains that
the founders of the JMSDF, many of
them IJN veterans, determined that the
prewar navy had been plagued by its
narrow professional focus. They concluded that IJN leaders and planners had
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failed to match naval strategy to national
security requirements. The result was an
impressive fleet designed to defeat another major navy rapidly in blue-water
action, when a more flexible force capable of securing and defending vital maritime interests might have served Japan
better. The force structure and mentality
of the IJN led to dramatic success for
Japan in the early stages of World War II,
but those gains could not be sustained,
and Japan’s poorly guarded sea lines of
communication became a vulnerability
that American submarines exploited to
decimate Japan’s merchant marine and
undermine the Japanese economy.
As a direct result of this experience,
writes Patalano, the founders of the
JMSDF sought to ensure that Japan’s new
navy would have a broad, maritime focus
rather than a narrow naval one, and that
new generations of naval leaders would
anchor their maritime strategies in
Japan’s national policy objectives. These
leaders also worked to make the JMSDF
immune to the internal rivalries that
wracked the IJN in the 1930s by centralizing the JMSDF’s command functions
under a single Maritime Staff Office
reporting to a single chief of maritime
staff firmly under the control of civilian
bureaucrats. The JMSDF’s study of the
IJN’s failure to secure its sea lines of
communication during World War II
influenced the prioritization of sea-lane
defense during the Cold War. Additionally, interservice rivalries that weakened
the efforts of the Imperial Japanese
Army and Navy during World War II
were addressed postwar by the consolidation of initial officer training to foster
interservice cooperation and camaraderie. Yet the IJN is more than a mere
cautionary tale—its esprit de corps and
traditions live on in the modern JMSDF.
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Patalano’s outstanding work falters only
when the author attempts to explain
the JMSDF’s current tactics as a function of its IJN heritage. While the IJN’s
influence on the JMSDF is undeniably
proven by the book’s analysis, the links
between the JMSDF’s identity and its
tactics are not clearly traced. It is the
reviewers’ experience and assessment
that JMSDF tactics are generally either
adopted directly from the United States
or the product of analytical efforts to
maximize the effectiveness of the force’s
combat systems vis-à-vis perceived
threats. While it is logical that culture
and identity elements are strong influences on those analytical processes,
Patalano’s argument lacks tangible
examples to delineate this connection
clearly. The link between JMSDF strategic culture and IJN heritage is clear,
but the relationship between the IJN
and modern JMSDF tactics is tenuous.
Well articulated, broad in scope, and
drawing on sources not previously accessed by Western researchers, Patalano’s
work delves into previously unexplored
territory essential to making sense of
Japanese decision making in the maritime domain. Given rapidly developing
events in East Asian waters, Post-war
Japan as a Sea Power deserves attention from anyone seeking to understand
maritime affairs in the Asia-Pacific.
CARLOS ROSENDE AND JOHN BRADFORD

Oliver, Dave. Against the Tide: Rickover’s Leadership Principles and the Rise of the Nuclear Navy.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014.
178pp. $27.95

Hyman Rickover almost single-handedly
delivered nuclear power to the United
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